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ABSTRACT
Outside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records,
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other records
containing individually identifiable health information in the course
of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice,
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review,
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters. This
Article is the first to argue that state rules of professional conduct, not
federal health information confidentiality regulations, should govern
outside health care counsel’s use and disclosure of confidential client
information, and that outside counsel should be excepted from direct
federal regulation under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
INTRODUCTION

O

utside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records,
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other
records containing individually identifiable health information in the
course of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice,
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review,
1
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters. This
Article examines the legal duties of confidentiality that apply to
outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a business
1 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Stone, Attorney Access to Medical Records, WIS. LAW., Oct.
2003, at 24, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin
_Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=49216 (discussing outside
health care counsel’s integral role in many aspects of their health care provider clients’
operational matters); Elizabeth C. Stone, Attorney Access To and Use of Medical Records,
WIS. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 18, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm
?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=34198
(explaining that outside health care counsel frequently need access to their health care
provider clients’ medical records).
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associate (BA) under federal health information confidentiality
2
regulations (Privacy Rule), giving special attention to the new duties
imposed on BAs by the Health Information Technology for Economic
3
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act within the American Recovery
4
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
This Article argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule
directly to outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a
BA is unjustified, illogical, and unnecessary, and will exacerbate
5
existing conflicts of interest. A proposed statutory amendment to
HITECH would give the federal Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) the authority to except certain classes of BAs,
including outside health care counsel, from direct regulation by the
Privacy Rule as well as from the imposition of civil and criminal
6
penalties. Further proposals would preserve and strengthen the
ability of state bars to impose sanctions on licensed attorneys who fail
7
to maintain the confidentiality of client communications and records.
Part I of this Article proceeds by reviewing the history of the
Privacy Rule. Part II examines the obligations of confidentiality
imposed by the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule: (1) directly on health
plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers
(covered entities); and (2) indirectly, by contract, on BAs, including
many outside health care attorneys. Part III explores the new, direct
duties of confidentiality that apply to BAs under HITECH as well as
HHS’s final modifications to the Privacy Rule implementing
HITECH. Part IV summarizes the duties of confidentiality that apply
to outside health care counsel under state rules of professional
conduct.
Part V argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule
directly to outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a
BA is unjustified, illogical, and unnecessary, and will exacerbate
existing conflicts of interest between health care attorneys and their
clients. In particular, Part V.A. demonstrates that Congress had ample
justification in 1996 for directing HHS to impose new confidentiality
2

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2011).
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH),
Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–79 (2009).
4 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
5 See infra Parts V.A.–C.
6 See infra Part VI.
7 See id.
3

TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE)

816

4/4/2013 8:39 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 813

requirements on health care providers and health plans given the
thousands of providers and plans that failed to maintain the
confidentiality of millions of patients and insureds. On the other hand,
Part V.A also presents research showing that only a handful of cases
involve claims against outside counsel for their alleged failure to
maintain the confidentiality of their clients’ individually identifiable
health information, suggesting that the longstanding regulation of
such attorneys by their state bars, as described in Part IV, may be
more than sufficient. Part V.B. explores particular provisions within
the Privacy Rule that HITECH extends directly to outside health care
counsel, and demonstrates how the application of these provisions to
outside health care counsel is illogical and unnecessary. Part V.B.
also argues that, unlike state bars, HHS may not have the knowledge,
skills, or experience necessary to regulate attorneys and other nonhealth industry participants. Part V.C. illustrates how HITECH’s
extension of the Privacy Rule to outside health care counsel will
exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between outside health care
counsel and their clients.
Part VI proposes that Congress amend HITECH to give HHS the
authority to except certain classes of BAs, including outside health
care counsel, from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. Part VI
offers language for the proposed statutory amendment and regulatory
exception. Part VI also outlines methods for preserving and
strengthening the ability of state bars to impose sanctions on licensed
attorneys who fail to maintain the confidentiality of client
information. This Article concludes with a recommendation that,
going forward, Congress and HHS more carefully consider the
application of health care-related regulations to non-health industry
participants.
I
THE PRIVACY RULE: A BRIEF HISTORY
As signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) had
several purposes, including improving portability and continuity of
health insurance coverage in the individual and group markets,
combating health care fraud and abuse, promoting the use of medical
savings accounts, improving access to long-term care services and
insurance coverage, and simplifying the administration of health
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8

insurance. The administrative simplification provisions, codified at
Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA, directed HHS to issue regulations
protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health information
if Congress failed to enact comprehensive privacy legislation within
9
three years of HIPAA’s enactment. When Congress failed to meet its
10
deadline, HHS incurred the duty to adopt privacy regulations.
HIPAA clarified, however, that any privacy regulations adopted by
HHS must be made applicable only to three classes of covered
entities: (1) health plans, (2) health care clearinghouses, and (3) health
care providers who transmit health information in electronic form in
11
connection with certain standard transactions.
12
HHS responded. On November 3, 1999, and December 28,
13
2000, HHS issued proposed and final rules, respectively, governing
the confidentiality of protected health information (“PHI”). On March
14
15
27, 2002, and August 14, 2002, HHS issued proposed and final
modifications to the Privacy Rule. With the exception of technical
16
the Privacy Rule
corrections and conforming amendments,
remained largely unchanged between 2002 and 2009.
8 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9 See id. § 264(c)(1) (“If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information . . . is not enacted by the date that is 36 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall promulgate final regulations containing such standards . . . .”).
10 See id.
11 Id. § 262(a) (“Any standard adopted under this part shall apply, in whole or in part,
to the following persons: ‘(1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health
care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1).’”); see also generally Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,924 (proposed
Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160–64) [hereinafter Proposed HIPAA
Privacy Rule] (explaining that HHS did not directly regulate any entity that was not a
“covered entity” because it did not have the statutory authority to do so).
12 Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,918.
13 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160–64) [hereinafter Final HIPAA
Privacy Rule].
14 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
14,776 (proposed modification Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
15 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
16 See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66
Fed. Reg. 12,434 (correction Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164);
Technical Corrections to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information Published December 28, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,944 (correction Dec. 29,
2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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The nature and scope of the legal duties of confidentiality that
applied to BAs, including many health care attorneys, changed
significantly over three years ago. On February 17, 2009, President
17
Obama signed ARRA into law. Division A/Title XIII of ARRA,
better known as HITECH, included certain privacy provisions that
imposed new duties, and allowed for the imposition of civil and
criminal penalties, directly on certain individuals who meet the
18
definition of a BA under the Privacy Rule.
Since ARRA’s enactment, HHS has been busy issuing proposed,
interim final, and final rules implementing HITECH’s privacy-related
requirements. On August 24, 2009, HHS released an interim final rule
implementing HITECH’s new breach notification requirements,
including a breach notification requirement that applies directly to
19
BAs. On October 30, 2009, HHS released an interim final rule
implementing HITECH’s strengthened enforcement provisions,
including strengthened civil monetary penalties that the federal Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) may, for the first time since the enactment of
the HIPAA statute, impose directly on BAs who fail to maintain the
20
confidentiality of PHI. On July 14, 2010, HHS released a proposed
rule that would modify the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Breach
21
Notification, and Enforcement Rules in accordance with HITECH.
On May 31, 2011, HHS released a proposed rule that would modify
22
the Privacy Rule’s accounting of disclosures requirement. On
September 14, 2011, HHS released a proposed rule that would modify
the Privacy Rule to provide individuals with the right to receive their
23
laboratory test reports directly from the testing laboratories. Finally,

17

ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–279 (2009).
19 Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg.
42,740 (interim Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
20 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,123 (interim
Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160) [hereinafter Enforcement Interim Final
Rule].
21 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg.
40,868 (proposed July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
22 HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures under the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 31,426 (proposed May
31, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) [hereinafter Proposed Accounting of
Disclosures Rule].
23 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 76 Fed.
Reg. 56,712 (proposed Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt.
164).
18
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on January 25, 2013, HHS released a final rule modifying the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, Breach Notification, and Enforcement Rules in
24
accordance with HITECH (Final Modifications). The proposals in
this Article are especially timely given HHS’s recent release of the
Final Modifications.
II
PRE-HITECH DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Direct Regulation of Covered Entities
As required by HIPAA, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule directly
regulated only the following covered entities: (1) health plans, (2)
health care clearinghouses, and (3) health care providers who transmit
health information in electronic form in connection with certain
25
standard transactions. Although HHS indicated its desire to regulate
all individuals and entities that receive or maintain individually
identifiable health information, HHS also recognized that the
rulemaking authority delegated to it by Congress in HIPAA was
26
limited only to covered entities.
The Privacy Rule directly regulates covered entities’ uses of,
disclosures of, and requests for individually identifiable health
information to the extent such information does not constitute: (1) an
education record protected under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA); (2) a student treatment record
excepted from protection under FERPA; or (3) an employment record
27
held by a covered entity in its role as an employer. The name given
by the Privacy Rule to the subset of individually identifiable health
information described in the previous sentence is protected health
information (PHI).

24 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to
the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5,566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160,
164) [hereinafter Final Modifications].
25 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011).
26 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,567.
27 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining protected health information). The Final Modifications
add a fourth category of information that is excluded from the definition of protected
health information; that is, individually identifiable health information regarding a person
who has been deceased for more than 50 years. See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at
5,689 (amending the definition of PHI at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103).
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The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to adhere to a number of
28
requirements when using and disclosing PHI. For example, covered
entities are allowed to freely use and disclose PHI for their “own
29
treatment, payment, or health care operations.” Because “health care
operations” is defined to include “legal services,” covered entities
may disclose PHI, including medical records, billing records, and
health insurance claims records, to outside health care counsel for
30
purposes of obtaining legal advice, counsel, and representation.
Covered entities also may use and disclose PHI for twelve different
public policy activities without the prior written authorization of the
31
individual who is the subject of the information. These public policy
activities include, but are not limited to, uses and disclosures required
32
33
by law,
uses and disclosures for public health activities,
34
disclosures for law enforcement activities, uses and disclosures for
35
36
research, and disclosures for workers’ compensation activities.
In the event that a covered entity would like to use or disclose PHI
for a purpose that is not treatment, payment, health care operations,
one of the public policy exceptions, or otherwise permitted or
required by the Privacy Rule, the covered entity must obtain the prior
written authorization of the individual who is the subject of the
37
information.
The Privacy Rule specifies the form of the
authorization, including certain required elements and statements that
are designed to place the individual on notice of how the individual’s
38
PHI will be used or disclosed.
In addition to the use and disclosure requirements, the Privacy Rule
39
also establishes five different individual rights. These rights include
the right of an individual to: (1) receive a notice of privacy

28

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502–164.514 (establishing the use and disclosure requirements).
Id. § 164.506(c)(1).
30 See id. § 164.501; see also Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,596
(stating that a covered entity “may disclose relevant information to its attorneys, who are
business associates, for purposes of health care operations, which includes uses and
disclosures” necessary to obtain legal services).
31 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.
32 Id. § 164.512(a).
33 Id. § 164.512(b).
34 Id. § 164.512(f).
35 Id. § 164.512(i).
36 Id. § 164.512(l).
37 See id. § 164.508(a)(1).
38 See id. § 164.508(c)(1), (2).
39 See id. §§ 164.520–164.528.
29
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41

practices, (2) request additional privacy protections, (3) access
42
43
PHI, (4) request amendment of incorrect or incomplete PHI, and
44
(5) receive an accounting of disclosures.
Finally, the Privacy Rule establishes ten administrative
45
requirements.
Pursuant to these administrative requirements,
covered entities must: (1) designate a privacy officer and a contact
person who are responsible for implementing the Privacy Rule and
receiving and processing privacy-related complaints; (2) train their
workforce members regarding the covered entity’s privacy policies
and procedures and the requirements of the Privacy Rule; (3) establish
appropriate physical, technical, and administrative safeguards to
protect the confidentiality of PHI; (4) provide a process for patients to
make privacy-related complaints to the covered entity and the
Secretary of HHS; (5) have and apply appropriate sanctions to
members of the covered entity’s workforce who violate the covered
entity’s privacy policies and procedures and the Privacy Rule; (6)
mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful effect that is known to
the covered entity of a use or disclosure of PHI that violates the
Privacy Rule; (7) not intimidate, threaten, coerce, discriminate, or
otherwise retaliate against any individual who exercises any right
available under the Privacy Rule; (8) not require patients to waive
their rights under the Privacy Rule as a condition of receiving
treatment; (9) implement policies and procedures designed to ensure
compliance with the Privacy Rule; and (10) maintain such policies
and procedures and other documentation required by the Privacy Rule
for six years from the date when the documentation was created or the
46
date when it last was in effect, whichever is later.

40

Id. § 164.520.
Id. § 164.522.
42 Id. § 164.524.
43 Id. § 164.526.
44 Id. § 164.528. HHS has proposed to give individuals an additional right; that is, the
right to receive a written access report. Proposed Accounting of Disclosures Rule, supra
note 22, at 31,448 (proposing new 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(b)(1), which would require
covered entities to provide individuals with a written access report upon their request).
45 45 C.F.R. § 164.530.
46 Id. § 164.530(a)–(j).
41

TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE)

822

4/4/2013 8:39 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 813

B. Indirect Regulation of Business Associates
Before HITECH, many individuals who did not meet the definition
47
of a covered entity and who were not members of the workforce of
a covered entity continued to require access to PHI in order to
perform functions, activities, and services for or on behalf of their
covered entity clients. Third-party billing companies, for example,
routinely receive PHI from their health care provider clients in order
48
to create and send claims for reimbursement to health insurers.
Outside accountants and actuaries also require access to billing and
claims records to provide accounting and actuarial services to their
49
health care provider and health plan clients. Pharmacy benefit
managers similarly require access to claims records to provide
50
pharmacy benefit management services to their health plan clients.
Before HITECH, these third-party billing companies, outside
accountants and actuaries, pharmacy benefit managers, and other
contractors fell within the definition of a BA and were not directly
regulated by the Privacy Rule.
Attorneys who provide legal services to covered entities other than
in the capacity of a workforce member of a covered entity also may
require access to a covered entity’s PHI in order to provide the
51
requested legal services. For example, an attorney who represents a
physician in a medical malpractice claim will require a copy of the
plaintiff’s medical record to prove to a court that the care provided by
47 Workforce means “employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose
conduct, in the performance of work for a covered entity, is under the direct control of
such entity, whether or not they are paid by the covered entity.” Id. § 160.103. The Final
Modifications expand the definition of workforce to include the workforce members of a
business associate: “Workforce means employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons
whose conduct, in the performance of work for a covered entity or business associate, is
under the direct control of such covered entity or business associate, whether or not they
are paid by the covered entity or business associate.” Final Modifications, supra note 24,
at 5,689 (amending the definition of workforce at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103).
48 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,475, 82,476 (noting that billing
firms require access to PHI of covered entity clients and therefore fall within the definition
of a BA).
49 See id. at 82,545 (noting that accountants require access to PHI to provide accounting
services to their covered-entity clients).
50 See id. at 82,466 (noting that covered entities frequently share PHI with pharmacy
benefit managers to obtain their services).
51 See id. at 82,596 (noting that attorneys need to use and disclose PHI in the course of
representing their covered entity clients); see also JOHN R. CHRISTIANSEN, PREEYA M.
NORONHA & BRAD M. ROSTOLSKY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES IN A HITECH WORLD 13
(2011) (listing a number of situations in which outside counsel will fall within the
definition of a BA).
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the physician adheres to the standard of care. Similarly, an attorney
who represents a hospital in an Emergency Medical Treatment and
52
claim will require copies of
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
emergency room records documenting the medical screening
examination and any necessary stabilizing treatment provided to the
presenting patient in order to defend the hospital in a claim by the
53
patient or the federal government. Likewise, an attorney who
represents a health care provider, health care supplier, or other
54
individual or institution in a fraud and abuse action may require
access to medical records, billing records, and other records showing
professional services rendered and insurance claims relating thereto.
Moreover, an attorney who represents a physician or allied health
55
professional in a hospital or other peer review matter may require
access to medical records containing entries authored by the health
care provider. In all of these examples, an attorney who is not a
workforce member of a covered entity requires access to PHI of the
covered entity in order to properly advise, counsel, represent, or
defend the covered entity and thus falls within the definition of a
56
BA. As discussed above and immediately below, the pre-HITECH
Privacy Rule did not directly regulate the attorney’s use or disclosure
of the PHI. As discussed in more detail in Part III, HITECH now
allows for the direct regulation of the attorney’s use and disclosure of
PHI by the federal government.
Before HITECH, the Privacy Rule did condition the disclosure of
PHI by a covered entity to a BA on the covered entity’s having a
written agreement with the BA pursuant to which the BA agreed to
57
maintain the confidentiality of the PHI received by the BA. More
52

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
Id. § 1395dd(a) (establishing a medical screening examination requirement); id. §
1395dd(b)(1) (establishing a necessary stabilizing treatment requirement).
54 Federal health care fraud and abuse authorities include the Anti-Kickback Statute,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b), the Physician Self-Referral Law (also known as the
Stark Law), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, and the False Claims Act, codified at 31
U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
55 The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) establishes procedures
to be followed by hospitals when removing physicians from their medical staffs in order to
qualify for immunity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11112. If a hospital fails to follow such
procedures, the immunity provision may not apply and the physician may have a claim
against the hospital under tort law, contract law, antitrust law, and other legal authorities.
Id. § 11111.
56 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1) (2011).
57 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,504 (“We do not attempt to directly
regulate business associates, but pursuant to our authority to regulate covered entities we
53
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specifically, the Privacy Rule permitted a covered entity to disclose
PHI to a BA only if the covered entity obtained satisfactory
assurances from the BA that the BA would appropriately safeguard
58
the PHI. The pre-HITECH Privacy Rule required the covered entity
to document the satisfactory assurances in a business associate
59
agreement (BAA) that meets certain requirements. The concepts of
the BA and the BAA were considered a “work-around” of HHS’s
60
jurisdictional limitations under the HIPAA statute.
61
The Privacy Rule required BAAs to contain several provisions.
First, unless both the covered entity and the BA are governmental
entities, the BAA must establish the permitted and required uses and
62
disclosures of such information by the BA. Although HITECH
63
slightly changed these requirements, before HITECH, the BAA also
must have provided that the BA would adhere to nine requirements,
including: (1) not using or further disclosing the information other
than as permitted or required by the BAA or as required by law; (2)
using appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the
information other than as provided for by the BAA; (3) reporting to
the covered entity any use or disclosure of the information not
provided for by the BAA of which the BA becomes aware; (4)
ensuring that any agents, including a subcontractor, to whom it
provides PHI received from, or created or received by the BA on
behalf of, the covered entity agree to the same restrictions and
64
conditions that apply to the BA with respect to such information; (5)
making available PHI in accordance with a Privacy Rule provision
giving patients a right to access their PHI; (6) making available PHI
for amendment and incorporating any amendments to PHI in
accordance with a Privacy Rule provision giving patients the right to
request amendment of incorrect or incomplete PHI; (7) making
available information required to provide an accounting of disclosures
place restrictions on the flow of information from covered entities to non-covered
entities.”).
58 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).
59 Id. § 164.502(e)(2).
60 See CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1.
61 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2).
62 Id. § 164.504(e)(2)(i).
63 See infra Part III.D.
64 The pre-HITECH requirement for a BA to ensure that any agents, including
subcontractors, adhered to the same confidentiality restrictions and conditions that applied
to the BA was (at least in practice) interpreted as a much looser standard than the
regulatory requirement for BAAs. See CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 3.
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in accordance with a Privacy Rule provision governing accountings of
disclosures; (8) making its internal practices, books, and records
relating to the use and disclosure of PHI received from, or created or
received by the BA on behalf of, the covered entity available to the
Secretary of HHS for purposes of determining the covered entity’s
compliance with the Privacy Rule; and (9) at termination of the
contract, if feasible, returning or destroying all PHI received from, or
created or received by the BA on behalf of, the covered entity that the
BA still maintains in any form and retaining no copies of such
information or, if such return or destruction is not feasible, extending
the protections of the contract to the information and limiting further
uses and disclosures to those purposes that make the return or
65
destruction of the information infeasible. Finally, the BAA must
authorize termination of the BAA by the covered entity if the covered
entity determines that the BA has violated a material term of the
66
agreement.
In summary, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule did not directly
67
regulate BAs, including many outside health care attorneys.
However, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule indirectly regulated BAs by
requiring covered entities to contractually obligate BAs to maintain
68
the confidentiality of any PHI received by the BA.
Before HITECH, a covered entity was considered not in
compliance with the Privacy Rule if the covered entity knew of a
pattern of activity or practice of the BA that constituted a material
breach or violation of the BAA unless the covered entity took
69
reasonable steps to cure the breach or end the violation. If those
steps were unsuccessful, the covered entity was required to “(A)
[t]erminate the contract or arrangement, if feasible; or (B) [i]f
termination [was] not feasible, report[] the problem to the Secretary
70
[of HHS].” A BA, including a covered entity’s outside health care
attorney, thus risked termination of both the BAA and the underlying
representation agreement (and thus the privilege and benefits of
representing the covered entity client) if the BA failed to maintain the
65

45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(11)(A)–(I).
Id. § 164.504(e)(2)(111).
67 See supra Part II.A.
68 See supra text accompanying note 65; see also CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51,
at 3 (“While BAs could not be reached by HIPAA directly, they were reached indirectly
by regulations which extended protections indirectly by requiring CEs to have a specific
form of contract . . . in place before allowing their BA access to their PHI.”).
69 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(11).
70 Id.
66
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confidentiality of PHI received from the client. Before HITECH,
however, a BA who failed to maintain the confidentiality of PHI did
not risk the imposition of civil or criminal penalties by the federal
government.
III
POST-HITECH DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. HITECH Overview
The nature and scope of the legal duties of BAs changed
substantially on February 17, 2009, when President Obama signed
71
ARRA, which includes HITECH, into law. In terms of the duties of
BAs, one of the most important provisions within HITECH is section
13404(a), which provides in relevant part: “The additional
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made
applicable with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to
such a business associate and shall be incorporated into the business
associate agreement between the business associate and the covered
72
entity.” That is, certain provisions within the Privacy Rule now
directly apply to BAs. Section 13404(a) is supported by HITECH
section 13404(c), a second important provision within HITECH,
which provides that the civil and criminal penalties set forth in the
HIPAA statute (codified at Sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social
Security Act) that heretofore only applied to covered entities now
may be imposed directly on BAs who fail to maintain the
73
confidentiality of their covered entity clients’ PHI.
A third
important HITECH provision is section 13402, which requires both
covered entities and BAs, following the discovery of a breach of
unsecured PHI (“uPHI”), to notify certain individuals and
74
organizations of such breach. HHS’s implementation of these
important HITECH sections is discussed in more detail below.

71 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–279 (2009).
72 HITECH § 13404(a).
73 Id. § 13404(c) (“In the case of a business associate that violates any provision of
subsection (a) or (b), the provisions of sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 1320d-5, 1320d-6 [sic]) shall apply to the business associate with respect to
such violation in the same manner as such provisions apply to a person who violates a
provision of part C of title XI of such Act.”).
74 See id. § 13402.
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B. Direct Regulation of Business Associates
Following the enactment of HITECH, many health care attorneys
questioned how HHS would implement HITECH section 13404(a)’s
requirement that privacy-related provisions be made applicable to
75
BAs. On January 25, 2013, HHS issued its Final Modifications,
which show how broadly HHS interprets HITECH section
76
13404(a).
More specifically, the preamble to the Final Modifications explains
that HITECH section 13404(a): (1) creates direct liability for BAs
when they use or disclose PHI other than in accordance with their
BAAs, and (2) applies the other privacy requirements of HITECH to
77
BAs just as they apply to covered entities. To implement these
HITECH changes, the Final Modifications significantly change the
opening provisions of the Privacy Rule set forth at 45 C.F.R. sections
78
164.500, 164.502, and 164.504.
In particular, the Final Modifications revise the first substantive
regulation within the Privacy Rule to provide that the standards,
requirements, and implementation specifications set forth in the
Privacy Rule apply to a BA with respect to the PHI of a covered
79
entity. As discussed in more detail in Part V.B., this provision is
somewhat illogical because most of the standards in the Privacy Rule
only make sense when applied to health plans and health care
providers, not non-health industry actors, including individual
80
attorneys or law firms. Stated another way, attorneys simply do not
engage in treatment, health insurance reimbursement, health care
utilization review, medical necessity reviews, determinations of
health insurance eligibility or coverage, adjudication or subrogation
of health benefit claims, risk adjustments based on a current or
prospective insured’s health status and demographic characteristics,
training of health care professionals, health care quality assessment
and improvement, development of clinical guidelines, health care
75

See id. § 13404(a).
Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,597.
77 Id. at 5,597; see also Jennifer A. Stiller, Lawyers Beware: Take Action Now to
Protect Healthcare Information or Risk Stiff Penalties, LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER A.
STILLER (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.healthregs.com/HITECH-HIPAA-BusinessAssociate
Rules.shtml (explaining that HITECH requires attorneys who represent physicians,
hospitals, health insurance companies, and other Covered Entities to directly comply with
the Privacy Rule).
78 Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695–97.
79 Id. at 5,695 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(c)).
80 See infra Part V.B.
76
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protocol development, case management and care coordination,
health care professional peer review, medical training of health care
professionals, health insurance underwriting, health insurance
premium rating, public health activities, biomedical and behavioral
research, and most other activities that are regulated by the standards,
requirements, and implementation specifications set forth in the
Privacy Rule.
In addition, the Final Modifications revise the Privacy Rule’s
second substantive regulation to generally provide that a BA, like a
covered entity, may not use or disclose PHI except as permitted or
81
required by the Privacy Rule or the HIPAA Enforcement Rule. For
example, if an outside health care attorney who meets the definition
of a BA sells a patient’s PHI without obtaining the prior written
authorization of the patient who is the subject of the PHI, the attorney
would be violating the Privacy Rule. By further example, if an outside
health care attorney who meets the definition of a BA inappropriately
uses, discloses, or requests more than the minimum amount of PHI
that is necessary to provide legal services to the covered entity, the
attorney also would be violating the Privacy Rule. As discussed in
more detail in Part V.A., this provision is also somewhat unnecessary
because, unlike the tens of thousands of documented cases of
confidentiality breaches by health plans and health care providers,
research revealed only a handful of cases in which outside counsel
breached the confidentiality of their covered entities’ PHI. In
addition, state rules of professional conduct already prohibit attorneys
from using and disclosing client records for inappropriate purposes.
The Final Modifications also add new sub-provisions within the
second substantive regulation to specifically address the permitted
82
and required uses and disclosures of PHI by BAs. For example, one
provision allows BAs to use or disclose PHI only as permitted or
83
required by their BAAs or as required by law. Thus, if an outside
health care attorney who constitutes a BA uses or discloses PHI for a
purpose other than the purposes (e.g., legal and other professional
services) specified in the BAA, the attorney would be violating the
Privacy Rule.
A second provision clarifies that a BA is not permitted to use or
disclose PHI in a manner that would violate the requirements of the
81
82
83

Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)).
Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(4)).
Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)).
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Privacy Rule if done by a covered entity. Thus, if it would be a
violation of the Privacy Rule for a covered hospital to sell a patient’s
PHI without the patient’s authorization, it would also be a violation of
the Privacy Rule for the covered hospital’s outside health care counsel
to sell a hospital patient’s PHI without the patient’s authorization.
A third provision obligates BAs to disclose PHI in certain
situations. For example, the Final Modifications obligate BAs to
disclose PHI to the covered entity, the patient or insured who is the
subject of the PHI, and/or the patient’s designee, as necessary to
satisfy the covered entity’s obligations relating to the individual’s
85
right to inspect and obtain a copy of his or her PHI. Thus, if a
patient requests a covered hospital to give the patient access to her
PHI and the covered hospital’s outside health care attorney, for some
reason, has PHI that the covered hospital does not (a highly unlikely
hypothetical), the attorney would be required under the Final
Modifications to provide PHI to the covered hospital or the individual
to facilitate the individual’s right of access to her PHI.
A fourth provision modifies the minimum necessary standard to
require that when BAs use, disclose, or request PHI, they must limit
the PHI to the minimum amount of information necessary to
86
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.
Stated another way, a BA is not making a permitted use or disclosure
under the Privacy Rule if the BA does not apply the minimum
87
necessary standard, where appropriate. An outside health care
attorney who constitutes a BA should be mindful of the Final
Modifications when requesting copies of medical records, billing
records, claims information, or other information that the attorney
needs in order to provide legal services to a covered entity client. If
the attorney needs only a discrete class of information in order to
provide the requested legal services, the attorney has a regulatory
obligation to limit her request to that discrete class of information. On
the other hand, many civil and criminal defense attorneys need access
to entire record sets in order to identify facts that could support the
application of a particular legal defense, such as contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, or assumption of the risk, in the
medical malpractice context. If a defense attorney requires an entire

84
85
86
87

Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)).
Id. (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(4)(ii)).
Id. at 5,697 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1)).
See id. at 5,597.
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record or record set to properly represent or defend a covered entity,
the attorney may continue to request the entire record or record set.
HHS amended the minimum necessary provisions to specifically
reference the obligation of a BA to only use, disclose, or request the
minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish the
intended purpose. However, HHS did not add references to BAs to
other provisions of the Privacy Rule that now apply to BAs. In the
preamble to the Final Modifications, HHS reasons that because the
Final Modifications prohibit a BA from using or disclosing PHI in
any manner that would violate the Privacy Rule if done by a covered
entity, additional references to BAs in the Privacy Rule’s use and
disclosure requirements are unnecessary: “[A]ny Privacy Rule
limitation on how a covered entity may use or disclose [PHI]
88
automatically extends to [BAs].”
C. Civil Penalties, Criminal Penalties, and Audits
HITECH provides that the civil and criminal penalties set forth in
the HIPAA statute and codified at sections 1176 and 1177 of the
Social Security Act now apply to BAs who violate any provision of
89
HITECH sections 13404(a) and 13404(b). On October 30, 2009,
HHS released an interim final rule implementing strengthened
enforcement provisions for the Privacy Rule, including strengthened
90
civil monetary penalties. In addition, HHS released the Final
Modifications implementing HITECH’s directed changes to the
Enforcement Rule on January 25, 2013. The Final Modifications
clarify (by adding the phrase “business associate” to many provisions
within the Administrative Simplification regulations) that the
Secretary of HHS may impose civil money penalties not only on
91
Covered Entities but also on BAs who violate the Privacy Rule.
This means that the Secretary may impose civil money penalties on
outside health care attorneys who meet the definition of a BA and
92
violate the Privacy Rule.
88

Id.
HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(c), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009).
90 Enforcement Interim Final Rule, supra note 20, at 56,123.
91 See, e.g., Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,691 (amending 45 C.F.R. §
160.402(a) to provide that “the Secretary will impose a civil money penalty upon a
covered entity or business associate if the Secretary determines that the covered entity or
business associate has violated an administrative simplification provision” (emphasis
added)).
92 For violations of the Privacy Rule occurring on or after February 18, 2009, the
Secretary may impose civil money penalties of $100 to $50,000 (if the BA did not know,
89
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Outside health care attorneys who meet the definition of a BA also
may be subject to criminal penalties. Criminal penalties remain at
their pre-HITECH levels, including: (1) criminal fines of not more
than $50,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both; (2)
for offenses committed under false pretenses, criminal fines of not
more than $100,000, imprisonment of not more than five years, or
both; and (3) for offenses committed “with intent to sell, transfer, or
use individually identifiable health information for commercial
advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” criminal fines of not
more than $250,000, imprisonment of not more than ten years, or
93
both.
Finally, HITECH section 13411 provides that BAs shall be subject
to periodic audits by the Secretary of HHS as one way of ensuring
that BAs are complying with their new privacy-related
94
requirements.
IV
DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER STATES RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The previous Parts examined the indirect and direct confidentiality
requirements imposed by the original Privacy Rule and HITECH,
respectively, on health care attorneys who meet the definition of a
BA. This Part examines the legal duties of confidentiality imposed on
all licensed attorneys, including licensed outside health care counsel,
by state rules of professional conduct. Under the American Bar
Association’s (ABA’s) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) and state rules of professional conduct, all licensed attorneys
have an ethical duty to maintain the confidentiality of client
information acquired during the course of, or by reason of
95
representation of, a client. The rule of confidentiality applies not
and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have known, of the violation); of $1,000
to $50,000 (if the violation was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect); of
$10,000 to $50,000 (if the violation was due to willful neglect and was corrected during
the first 30 days); and of $50,000 (if the violation was due to willful neglect and was not
corrected during the first 30 days). See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,583
(charting the different penalty levels). However, civil money penalties may not exceed
$1.5 million for identical violations in a calendar year regardless of the BA’s level of
culpability. Id.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
94 HITECH § 13411.
95 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011); TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 amendments).
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only to matters communicated to the attorney in confidence by the
client, but also to all information relating to the representation,
96
whatever its source. Medical records, billing records, and other
information and data obtained by a health care attorney while
representing a patient or health industry client constitutes
“confidential information” for purposes of rules of the professional
97
responsibility.
Except as otherwise permitted, most state rules prohibit an attorney
from knowingly revealing confidential information of a client or
former client to: (1) a person that the client has instructed is not to
receive the information; or (2) any other person, other than the client,
the client’s representatives, or the members, associates, or employees
98
of the attorney’s law firm. These rules would prohibit, for example,
a health care attorney from disclosing the contents of medical or
billing records obtained during the course of representation to the
attorney’s spouse, partner, or friends, or to other third parties for
purposes unrelated to the legal advice and counsel for which the
attorney was retained.
Most state rules of professional conduct also prohibit an attorney
from: (1) using confidential information of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation;
(2) using confidential information of a former client to the
disadvantage of the former client after the representation is concluded
unless the former client consents after consultation or the confidential
information has become generally known; or (3) using privileged
information of a client for the advantage of the attorney or of a third
99
person, unless the client consents after consultation. These rules
would, of course, prohibit a health care attorney from selling medical
record or other patient or insured data to a newspaper or tabloid for
96 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 361
(Wis. 2001).
97 See, e.g., id. (adjudicating a disciplinary action taken by then-named Wisconsin
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) against a Wisconsin-licensed
attorney for his failure to maintain the confidentiality of his client’s medical records; the
Board suspended the attorney’s license to practice law for six months after finding, among
other things, that the client “did not authorize [the attorney] to release her medical records
to anyone. [The attorney’s] disclosure of information that he obtained while representing
[the client] violated client-lawyer confidentiality”; the Wisconsin Supreme Court further
explained that “the rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters
communicated in confidence by the client, . . . but also to all information relating to the
representation whatever its source.’”).
98 See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(b)(1).
99 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(b)(2)–(4).
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the financial advantage of the attorney or to the disadvantage of the
attorney’s health industry client.
Most state rules of professional conduct permit an attorney to
reveal unprivileged client information in certain situations, including:
(1) when impliedly authorized to do so in order to carry out the
representation; and (2) when the attorney has reason to believe it is
necessary to do so in order to: (i) carry out the representation
effectively; (ii) defend the attorney or the attorney’s employees or
associates against a claim of wrongful conduct; (iii) respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the attorney’s representation
of the client; or (iv) prove the services rendered to a client, or the
reasonable value thereof, or both, in an action against another person
or organization responsible for the payment of the fee for services
100
rendered to the client.
These rules would thus permit an attorney
who specializes in medical malpractice to use medical record data in
petitions, answers, counterclaims, motions and other pleadings as
necessary to bring or defend a health care liability claim.
Most state rules of professional conduct also permit an attorney to
reveal confidential information acquired during the course of or
reason of representation of a client: (1) when the attorney has been
expressly authorized to do so in order to carry out the representation;
(2) when the client consents after consultation; (3) to the client, the
client’s representatives, or the members, associates, and employees of
the attorney’s firm, except when otherwise instructed by the client;
(4) when the attorney has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in
order to comply with a court order, a state rule of professional
conduct, or other law; (5) to the extent reasonably necessary to
enforce a claim or establish a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client; (6) to establish a
defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint
against the attorney or the attorney’s associates based upon conduct
involving the client or the representation of the client; (7) when the
attorney has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act; and
(8) to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the
consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the
101
commission of which the attorney’s services had been used. Health
care attorneys routinely rely on some of these exceptions to
100
101

See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(d)(1)–(2).
See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(c)(1)–(8).
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confidentiality. For example, the third clause in the previous sentence
permits a senior partner or shareholder who is representing a health
industry client to share medical records, billing records, and other
individually identifiable health information with a junior associate,
paralegal, or other law firm employee who is needed by the senior
partner to assist in the representation of the client.
An attorney’s state law duty of confidentiality to a client is
grounded in the fiduciary duty owed by the attorney to the client as
102
well as the need for the legal system to function properly.
Without
an assurance of confidentiality, a health industry client may fail to
seek early legal assistance or fully disclose the facts of the matter to
103
her attorney.
An attorney’s duty of confidentiality is given effect
not only in state rules of professional conduct but also in the law of
evidence regarding the attorney-client privilege as well as through the
104
law of agency. The attorney-client privilege, for example, provides
patients and health industry clients the right to prevent certain
confidential communications from being revealed by compulsion of
105
law.
In summary, the provisions governing confidentiality in most state
rules of professional conduct are comprehensive and detailed. The
provisions explain exactly when an attorney can and cannot use and
disclose confidential client information, and carefully balance a
client’s need for confidentiality with the attorney’s need to use and
disclose information to carry out the representation. Unlike the
Privacy Rule, there are no provisions governing confidentiality in the
state rules that are nonsensical when applied to attorneys. All of the
permissions and prohibitions set forth in the state rules govern
activities that come up on a daily basis in an attorney’s practice.
These state rules, drafted by attorneys for attorneys, should govern an
attorney’s use and disclosure of confidential client information.
V
ARGUMENTS AGAINST HITECH’S EXTENSION OF THE PRIVACY RULE
TO OUTSIDE HEALTH CARE COUNSEL
This Part argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule’s
confidentiality requirements directly to outside health care counsel
102
103
104
105

See, e.g., id. R. 1.05 cmt. 1.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. R. 1.05 cmt. 3.
See, e.g., id.
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who meet the definition of a BA is unjustified, illogical, and
unnecessary, and will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between
health care attorneys and their health industry clients.
A. HITECH’s Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care
Counsel Is Unjustified
Congress’s initial decision in 1996 to directly regulate health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers was well
justified. First, remember that Congress’s purpose in enacting
HIPAA’s Administrative Simplification provisions was to improve
the Medicare and Medicaid programs (two covered health plans), as
well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system more
generally by encouraging the development of a health information
system through the establishment of standards and requirements for
106
the electronic transmission of certain health information. Congress
also recognized, however, that the increased accessibility of health
information made possible by the widespread and growing use of
electronic media by health plans and health care providers, as well as
the new federal mandate for standard transactions and code set use by
health plans and health care providers, would require enhanced
107
confidentiality requirements. No such federal mandate for standard
108
transaction and code set use was applied to BAs, including outside
health care counsel. Without a requirement to electronically transmit
health information, there was no resulting increase in the risk of a
confidentiality breach by such BAs, including outside health care
counsel.

106 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012). At the time of HIPAA’s enactment, approximately 400
different health insurance claim formats were in use in the United States. The submission
of electronic health care claims was limited, then, because most health care providers
could support only a handful of formats. In order to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system, Congress directed HHS to create uniform
standards for health insurance-related transactions as well as uniform codes (called
‘standard transactions and code sets’) to be used in those transactions. See William P.
Matthews, Caught Up In the Expanding Net: Regulation of the Business Associate Under
the HIPAA Privacy Regulations, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2003, at 32, 33 (explaining the
need for standard transactions and code sets).
107 Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,928; see also Alex L. Bednar,
HIPAA Implications for Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 871, 880 (2004)
(discussing the legislative history of HIPAA, including the belief of some legislators that
electronic technology innovation would increase privacy and security concerns).
108 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining standard transactions and
code sets).
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Like Congress, HHS also recognized that the growing use of
computerization in the health care industry, including the rapid
growth of electronic transfers of health information between and
among health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care
109
providers, gave rise to significant confidentiality concerns:
[M]ore and more health care providers, plans, and others are
utilizing electronic means of storing and transmitting health
information. In 1996, the health care industry invested an estimated
$10 billion to $15 billion on information technology . . . . The
electronic information revolution is transforming the recording of
health information so that
the disclosure of information may require
110
only a push of a button.

HHS further explained that the number of health care industry
participants that maintain and transmit individually identifiable health
information has increased over the last decade: “The health care
industry has been transformed from one that relied primarily on oneon-one interactions between patients and clinicians to a system of
integrated health care delivery networks and managed care
111
providers.”
HHS’s concerns were supported by relevant findings of the
112
American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA).
According to AHIMA, approximately 150 health care providers and
ancillary hospital service providers—including physicians, nurses, xray technicians, and billing clerks—”have access to a patient’s
113
medical records during the course of a typical hospitalization.”
According to other research organizations, such as the National
Research Council, health care providers and plans frequently shared
individually identifiable health information with consulting
physicians, managed care organizations, health insurance companies,
life insurance companies, self-insured employers, pharmacies,
pharmacy benefit managers, clinical laboratories, accrediting
organizations, state and federal statistical agencies, and medical
114
information bureaus.
Although some of these individuals and
organizations had a legitimate need to access, use, and disclose
medical, billing, and claims records, over-sharing such information
109
110
111
112
113
114

Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,928.
Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,465.
Id. at 82,466.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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increased the risk that patients’ confidential information would be
leaked to outside sources. However, at that time, there were no federal
statutes or regulations governing which classes of individuals could
access, use, and disclose these records, what information in the
records should and could be accessed, used, and disclosed, and the
use and disclosure restrictions that should attach to such information.
Concerns about the lack of attention to health information
confidentiality by health care providers, health plans, and other health
115
care industry participants were not just theoretical.
In 1993,
Johnson & Johnson, the New Jersey-based multi-national
manufacturer of pharmaceutical, diagnostic, therapeutic, surgical, and
biotechnology products, marketed a list of five million names and
116
addresses of elderly incontinent women without their permission.
In 1996, an employee of the Tampa, Florida, health department
removed from her work a computer disk containing the names of
117
4,000 people who had tested positive for HIV.
In 1999, a
Michigan-based health system accidentally posted the medical
118
records of thousands of patients on the Internet.
In 2000, a Utahbased pharmaceutical benefit management firm used patient data to
119
solicit business for its owner, a drug store. The same year, a patient
in a Boston-area hospital discovered that her medical records had
120
been read by more than 200 of the hospital’s employees.
Even after the April 14, 2003, general compliance date for the
121
HIPAA Privacy Rule,
health care providers and health plans
continued to inappropriately use and disclose PHI. For example,
between 2005 and 2008, numerous members of the workforce of
covered health care provider UCLA Health System repeatedly and
122
without permission examined the electronic PHI of UCLA patients.
By further example, between 2005 and 2009, covered health care
provider Phoenix Cardiac Surgery failed to have in place appropriate
and reasonable administrative and technical safeguards to protect the
115

Id. at 82,467.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2011).
122 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan 08-82727 and 08-83510
between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and
the Regents of the University of California, 1–2 (July 6, 2011), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/uclahsracap.pdf.
116
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confidentiality of PHI, which contributed to the posting of over 1,000
separate entries of ePHI on a publicly accessible, Internet-based
calendar and the daily transmission of ePHI from an Internet-based
email account to workforce members’ personal Internet-based email
123
accounts.
On several occasions in 2006, Rite Aid pharmacies located in cities
across the United States disposed of paper PHI in open dumpsters
potentially accessible to persons who were not members of Rite Aid’s
124
workforce.
Television media actually videotaped Rite Aid
pharmacy workforce members disposing of prescriptions and labeled
pill bottles containing patient identifiable information in industrial
125
trash containers that were accessible to the general public.
Similarly, and on several occasions in 2006 and 2007, CVS
pharmacies located in cities across the United States also disposed of
paper PHI in open dumpsters potentially accessible to persons who
126
were not members of CVS’s workforce. Media outlets also caught
127
the CVS disposals on videotape.
Some of the covered health plans and health care providers who
were inappropriately using and disclosing PHI were doing so for
marketing purposes. Between 2007 and 2010, for example, covered
entity Management Services Organization Washington, Inc. (MSO)
impermissibly disclosed PHI to Washington Practice Management

123 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Phoenix Cardiac
Surgery, P.C., 2 (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa
/enforcement/examples/pcsurgery_agreement.pdf.
124 See Written Resolution Agreement and Collective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Rite Aid
Corporation, 1 (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa
/enforcement/examples/riteaidres.pdf.
125 See Rite Aid Agrees to Pay $1 Million to Settle HIPAA Privacy Case, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples
/riteaidresagr.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
126 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and CVS Pharmacy,
Inc., 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement
/examples/cvsresagrcap.pdf.
127 See Resolution Agreement: CVS Pays $2.25 Million & Toughens Disposal Practices
to Settle HIPAA Privacy Case, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/cvsresolutionagreement.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2012).
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(WPM) without a valid authorization to enable WPM to market
128
Medicare Advantage plans to those individuals.
Some covered health plan and health care provider disclosures
were due to theft. In 2009, for example, covered health plan Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee (BCBST) discovered a theft of
computer equipment, including 57 hard drives believed to contain
over one million health plan member names, identification numbers,
129
diagnosis codes, dates of birth, and social security numbers.
The
data stolen also included over 300,000 video recordings and over one
million audio recordings containing patient identifiable
130
information. BCBST internal investigation confirmed that the PHI
131
of 1,023,209 individuals was stored on the hard drives.
Also in
2009, an Alaska Department of Health and Social Services computer
technician had a portable electronic device potentially containing
132
ePHI stolen from his vehicle.
Some inappropriate disclosures by covered health plans and health
care providers were caused by the behavior of just one covered entity
employee. In 2009, for example, a Massachusetts General Hospital
(MGH) employee removed from MGH premises documents
133
containing PHI so that the employee could work from home. The
PHI consisted of billing encounter forms containing the name, date of
birth, medical record number, health insurer and policy number,
diagnosis and name of provider of 66 patients and the practice’s daily
office schedules for three days containing the names and medical

128 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Management
Services Organization Washington, Inc., 1 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.hhs
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/msoresultionagreement.pdf.
129 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and BlueCross
BlueShield of Tennessee, 1–2 (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy
/hipaa/enforcement/examples/resolution_agreement_and_cap.pd.
130 Id. at 1.
131 Id. at 2.
132 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services, 1 (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.hhs
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/alaska-agreement.pdf.
133 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and The General
Hospital Corporation and Massachusetts General Physicians Organization, Inc., 1 (Feb. 14,
2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/mass
generalracap.pdf [hereinafter MGH Resolution Agreement].
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134

record numbers of 192 patients
of MGH’s Infectious Disease
135
Associates outpatient practice, including patients with HIV/AIDS.
Three days later, when the employee was commuting back to work on
the subway, the employee removed the records containing PHI from
136
her bag and placed them on the seat beside her. Upon exiting the
subway, the MGH employee left the documents on the subway train
and they were never recovered.
As of July 31, 2012, OCR had investigated and resolved 17,025
cases of Privacy Rule violations by requiring changes in privacy
practices and other corrective actions by covered health plans and
137
health care providers. The most common types of covered entities
that were required to take corrective action to achieve voluntary
compliance were, in order of frequency: private medical practices,
general hospitals, outpatient facilities, health plans (including group
138
health plans and health insurance issuers), and pharmacies.
In summary, Congress’s initial decision in 1996 to directly regulate
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care
providers was well justified. Before and after the compliance date for
the Privacy Rule, thousands of health industry participants had
inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of patients and
139
insureds.
Even though thousands of health industry participants
inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of patients and
insureds, the question is whether there is any evidence that outside
health care counsel also were (or are) inappropriately using or
disclosing PHI received from their health industry clients. Because
HHS did not directly regulate outside health care counsel and other
BAs prior to HITECH, HHS would not be the source of such
information, at least such information dating prior to HITECH. After
HITECH, when Congress gave HHS the statutory authority to directly

134

Id.
Resolution Agreement: Massachusetts General Hospital Settles Potential HIPAA
Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy
/hipaa/enforcement/examples/massgeneralra.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
136 MGH Resolution Agreement, supra note 133, at 1.
137 See Enforcement Highlights (as of July 31, 2012), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/07312012
.html (follow “Enforcement Results as of the Date of This Summary” hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 26, 2013).
138 Id.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 116 to 138.
135
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140

regulate BAs
and gave state attorneys general the statutory
authority to take action against covered entities and BAs in their
141
research
states who inappropriately used and disclosed PHI,
revealed only one action against a BA. However, that BA was not an
attorney. On July 31, 2012, Minnesota Attorney General Lori
Swanson (AG) announced that business associate Accretive Health,
Inc., a Chicago-based debt collector that managed the revenue
operations of several Minnesota hospitals, was being forced to cease
operations in the State of Minnesota under a settlement of the AG’s
142
federal lawsuit against Accretive. One of the reasons for the AG’s
lawsuit was the discovery that an Accretive laptop containing data on
over 23,000 patients of two Minnesota covered hospitals was stolen
143
from the rental car of an Accretive employee. Accretive’s failure to
maintain the confidentiality of its client hospitals’ PHI does not
suggest that attorneys as a class are unable to maintain client
confidentiality.
Another source of information regarding the inappropriate use or
disclosure of PHI by BAs might be states that, through state health
information confidentiality laws that are similar to the federal Privacy
Rule, apply directly to BAs. Since its enactment in 2001, for example,
the Texas Medical Records Privacy Act (Texas Act) has always
directly regulated Covered Entities, BAs, and any other person who
144
comes into possession of, obtains, or stores PHI. That is, the Texas
140 See HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The
additional requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable
with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”).
The date by which BAs must comply with their new obligations under the Final
Modifications is September 23, 2013. Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,566.
Therefore, HHS has not yet taken action against a BA for its failure to comply with the
Final Modifications.
141 See HITECH § 13410(e) (“[I]n any case in which the attorney general of a State has
reason to believe than an interest of one or more of the residents of that State has been or is
threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates a provision of this part, the
attorney general of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of such
residents of the State in a district court of the United States of appropriate jurisdiction
. . . .”).
142 Attorney General Swanson Says Accretive Will Cease Operations in the State of
Minnesota Under Settlement of Federal Lawsuit, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. LORI
SWANSON (July 31, 2012), http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/07312012
AccretiveCeaseOperations.asp.
143 Id.
144 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(A)–(D) (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Sess.); see also Bednar, supra note 107, at 906 (explaining that “[t]he result
of [the Texas Act’s overbroad language] is that countless persons with no direct
relationship to health care are statutorily liable for safeguarding PHI in Texas”).
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Act has always directly regulated outside health care counsel who
receive medical records, billing records, and other records containing
PHI from their health industry clients. Enforcement of the Texas Act
145
146
includes injunctive relief,
civil penalties,
investigation and
147
148
and attorney general action.
Effective
disciplinary actions,
September 1, 2012, the Texas Legislature the civil penalties that may
be imposed on BAs and other individuals who violate the Texas Act;
that is, civil penalties may be assessed up to: (1) $5,000 per violation
that is committed negligently; (2) $25,000 per violation that is
committed knowingly or intentionally; (3) $250,000 per violation that
is committed intentionally and if PHI is used for financial gain; and
149
(4) $1.5 million if a “pattern or practice” is found.
As of this
writing, research revealed no injunctions, civil penalties, investigative
or disciplinary actions, or attorney general actions taken against any
Texas-licensed attorneys (or any other BAs, for that matter) for their
failure to maintain the confidentiality of PHI received from their
covered entity clients in accordance with the Texas Act.
Another source of information regarding the possible inappropriate
use or disclosure of PHI by outside health care counsel would be
cases in which state-licensed health-care attorneys had been accused
by a state agency of violating state rules of professional conduct that
require attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client
communications, as described in Part IV of this Article. Research
revealed only two published opinions in cases in which a state agency
accused an attorney of failing to maintain the confidentiality of PHI
received from a client.
In In re Harman, Wisconsin-licensed attorney Donald Harman was
accused by the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility (Board) of a number of rule violations, including
mishandling client funds, representing a client in the presence of a
conflict of interest without obtaining a written consent of the conflict,
knowingly disobeying an obligation of tribunal rules, using
information obtained during the representation of a former client to
that former client’s disadvantage, and revealing information relating

145
146
147
148
149

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.201(a).
Id. § 181.201(b).
Id. § 181.202.
Id. § 181.201(e).
Id. § 181.201(b)(1)–(3), (c).
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to the representation of the client without the client’s consent. With
respect to the final allegation, Harman was consulted by a client about
a potential legal malpractice action against another attorney who had
151
formerly represented the client in a medical malpractice action. In
connection with the potential legal malpractice representation,
Harman obtained the former attorney’s files, including the client’s
medical records, which contained information about the client’s drug
152
and alcohol dependence and history of self-abusive behavior.
Without the client’s consent, Harman disclosed the client’s drug and
alcohol dependence and history of self-abusive behavior to a
Wisconsin county district attorney who was prosecuting the client’s
153
former boyfriend for domestic abuse of the client.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Harman violated Rule
1.6(a) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
when he disclosed the client’s drug and alcohol dependence and
154
history of self-abusive behavior to the district attorney.
The court
explained: “[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle’ in the client-lawyer
relationship that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of ‘information
155
relating to the representation.’” The court further explained: “[T]he
rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters
communicated in confidence by the client, ‘. . . but also to all
156
information relating to the representation whatever its source.’”
The court upheld the board’s recommendation that Harman’s license
157
to practice law be suspended for six months.
Far from suggesting that outside health care counsel as a class
routinely make inappropriate uses or disclosures of PHI, the Harman
case suggests that one general practice attorney who had a lengthy
history of professional conduct problems (this was Harman’s fourth
disciplinary action) may need more stringent sanctions imposed on
him by his state bar. The case also illustrates, however, a weakness
associated with the use of the post-HITECH Privacy Rule as a
mandate for attorney confidentiality. The post-HITECH Privacy Rule

150 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Wis.
2001).
151 Id. at 358.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 361.
155 Id. at 361.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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only protects a patient’s PHI when it is in the hands of an attorney
who represents a covered entity, such as a health care provider or
health plan. When an attorney represents a patient or insured, the
post-HITECH Privacy Rule does not regulate the attorney’s use or
disclosure of the PHI because the patient or insured does not fall
within the definition of a covered entity. This Article argues that a
patient’s or insured’s health information should not have fewer
confidentiality protections simply because the attorney who maintains
the information is directly representing the patient or insured instead
of the patient’s or insured’s health care provider or health plan. State
rules of professional conduct, by contrast, appropriately require
adherence to rules of confidentiality by all attorneys, including
attorneys who represent health care providers and health plans as well
as attorneys who represent patients and insureds.
In addition to In re Harman, research revealed only one other
published opinion in which a state agency accused an attorney of
failing to maintain the confidentiality of PHI received from a client.
In In re Mullins, Indiana-licensed attorney Patty Sue Mullins was
accused by the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission of
violating Rule 1.6 of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys at Law (Indiana Rule 1.6), which prohibits lawyers from
158
revealing confidential client information.
As background, the
parents of an Indiana woman who was in a persistent vegetative state
had petitioned an Indiana court for authority to compel the woman’s
health care providers to withdraw the woman’s artificiallyadministered hydration and nutrition based on the parents’ belief that
159
the daughter would never recover from her brain injury.
Mullins,
who disagreed with the parents’ plan, created an Indiana corporation
named the Christian Fellowship with the Disabled, Inc. (Fellowship)
and filed on behalf of the Fellowship a petition that would appoint
Mullins as temporary guardian of the woman based on Mullins’s
belief that the woman was being medically neglected due to her lack
160
of hydration and nutrition.
After a court appointed Mullins as
temporary guardian, Mullins faxed portions of the woman’s medical
records to several news media outlets throughout Marion County,
Indiana, apparently in an attempt to justify Mullins’s involvement in
161
the litigation.
158
159
160
161

In re Mullins, 649 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind. 1995).
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Indiana held that Mullins violated Indiana
Rule 1.6, reasoning that “no legitimate or recognized justification for
162
[Mullins’s] county-wide dissemination of the records” existed. The
Court further explained that the woman’s medical record was
“information relating to representation of a client” within Indiana
Rule 1.6 and that “[a] lawyer must make every effort practicable to
avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a
representation, [and] to limit disclosure to those having a need to
163
know it.”
In light of Mullins’s lack of prior disciplinary actions,
her devotion of significant time and energy during her legal career to
public causes, and her lack financial or other sinister motives, the
164
court ordered only public reprimand and admonishment.
The Mullins case is a second example of a general practice
attorney, not a health care attorney, who inappropriately disclosed a
client’s PHI. Like Harman, the Mullins case also illustrates a
weakness associated with the use of the post-HITECH Privacy Rule
as a mandate for attorney confidentiality. Again, the post-HITECH
Privacy Rule would not have regulated Mullins because Mullins was
representing a patient, not a covered entity. And, again, this Article
argues that a patient’s health information should not have fewer
confidentiality protections simply because the attorney who maintains
that information is directly representing the patient instead of the
patient’s health care provider. State rules of professional conduct,
including the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at
Law, appropriately require adherence to rules of confidentiality by all
attorneys, including attorneys who represent health care providers as
well as attorneys who represent patients.
In addition to the two published opinions in Harman and Mullins,
research also revealed one unpublished opinion in which a state
agency accused an attorney of failing to maintain the confidentiality
of PHI received from a client. In Statewide Grievance Committee v.
Paige, the Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee (Committee)
accused Connecticut-licensed attorney Sheri Paige of violating eight
different Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule
1.6 relating to the confidentiality of client information, in connection
with the representation of a client with respect to his application for

162
163
164

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
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165

immigration to the United States.
In particular, when Paige
provided the individual with a list of information that would assist
Paige in processing the immigration application, the list was
handwritten on the reverse side of a piece of paper that contained
166
medical information relating to another client of Paige’s.
The
medical information included the name of the client’s treating
167
physician and the details of the physician’s medical bill.
The
Superior Court of Connecticut held that “[b]y allowing access to this
168
Given
confidential information, [Paige] violated Rule 1.6(a).”
Paige’s significant prior disciplinary history, the number of rule
violations associated with the instant representation, and the lack of
any mitigating factors, the court suspended Paige from the practice of
169
law for a period of one year.
As in Harman and Mullins, the
Statewide Grievance Committee case would not have implicated the
post-HITECH Privacy Rule because Paige inappropriately disclosed
the PHI of a client who was a patient, not a covered entity.
Another source of information regarding the possible inappropriate
use or disclosure of PHI by outside health care counsel would be
cases in which private plaintiffs accused their health care providers or
health plans’ outside health care counsel of inappropriately using or
disclosing PHI. Research revealed only one relevant case. In Biddle v.
Warren General Hospital, several patients brought a class action
against a hospital and its outside law firm, alleging that the hospital
inappropriately disclosed PHI to the law firm to enable the law firm to
search for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for the
170
payment of patients’ unpaid medical bills.
In addition to holding
that an independent tort exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged
disclosure of confidential information by the hospital to the law
171
firm, the Supreme Court of Ohio also held that the law firm could
be held independently liable for inducing the hospital’s unauthorized
172
and tortious disclosure of information to the firm.
The court
reasoned that the attorney’s need for the information (including the

165 Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Paige, No. CV030198335S, 2004 WL 1833462, at
*2–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 2004).
166 Id. at *2.
167 Id. at *7.
168 Id. at *7.
169 Id. at *9.
170 Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 518 (Ohio 1999).
171 Id. at 523.
172 Id. at 528.
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attorney’s desire to benefit the patients by making them eligible for
SSI) was irrelevant unless the need also advanced or protected some
173
The court further reasoned that
interest giving rise to a privilege.
the only interest that had been recognized in such regard was the
patient’s interest in obtaining medical care and treatment, and that
disclosure would be limited to those who have a legitimate interest in
174
the patient’s health.
In the end, the court held that the law firm
could be held liable for inducing the hospital’s unauthorized,
unprivileged disclosure of nonpublic medical information learned
175
within the context of the physician-patient relationship.
Unlike the attorneys in Harman, Paige, and Statewide Grievance
Committee, the law firm in Biddle was using and disclosing the PHI
of a covered entity; that is, a hospital. The law firm in Biddle thus
would have been regulated by the Privacy Rule had the facts in Biddle
not occurred in the mid-1990s, almost a decade before the 2003
compliance date for the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule and fifteen years
prior to HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule directly to BAs.
However, even if the case had occurred later in time, the Privacy Rule
would have allowed the hospital and law firm to use and disclose the
patients’ PHI without their prior authorization in order to determine
SSI eligibility; that is, the Privacy Rule expressly permits covered
entities and their BAs to use and disclose PHI for certain “payment”
activities and the definition of “payment” includes determinations of
176
insurance eligibility and coverage. In summary, Ohio tort law, not
the Privacy Rule, would have prohibited the hospital and law firm’s
activities.
Other than Harman, Paige, Statewide Grievance Committee, and
Biddle, research revealed no other cases in which a state-licensed
attorney was accused by a state agency in an administrative action or
a client in a private tort action of inappropriately using or disclosing
PHI received from the client. This Article assumes that our careful
research missed a few cases that did not contain standard search terms
such as “attorney!,” “lawyer!,” “counsel!,” “law firm!,” “law
practice,” “medical record!”, “health record!,” “health information,”
“confidential!,” “privacy,” “private,” and “Rule 1.6,” but that did
173

Id.
Id.
175 Id.
176 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1) (2011) (“A covered entity may use or disclose protected
health information for its own treatment, payment, or health care operations.”); id. §
164.501 (defining “payment” to include “[d]eterminations of eligibility or coverage”).
174
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involve an allegation by a state agency or a private plaintiff against an
attorney or law firm for the failure to maintain the confidentiality of
PHI. Even assuming a 500 percent error rate in our research, research
would reveal twenty or fewer judicial opinions involving cases in
which outside counsel failed to maintain the confidentiality of PHI.
Twenty cases of inappropriate uses and disclosures of PHI by outside
counsel probably do not justify Congress and HHS’s decision to
extend the Privacy Rule when compared to the thousands of covered
entities who inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of
patients and insureds.
Assuming for the moment that Congress and HHS had sufficient
justification for extending the Privacy Rule directly to attorneys who
constitute BAs, note that in three of the four cases described above
the Privacy Rule would not have regulated (or deterred) the conduct
described because the defendant attorneys in those cases failed to
maintain the PHI of clients who were patients, not covered entities. In
the fourth case, Biddle, the Privacy Rule would now regulate the
defendant law firm’s use and disclosure of the PHI it received from its
covered hospital client; however, the Privacy Rule explicitly
authorizes the use and disclosure of PHI for the SSI eligibility
purposes described in Biddle. In summary, the extension of the
Privacy Rule directly to attorneys who meet the definition of a BA
would not have made any difference to the outcomes of the four
identified cases in which an attorney allegedly inappropriately used
and disclosed PHI.
Compared to state rules of professional conduct described in Part
IV, the Privacy Rule thus has several weaknesses. First, the Privacy
Rule only regulates attorneys who represent covered entities, whereas
state rules of professional conduct appropriately regulate all attorneys
with respect to their use and disclosure of confidential client
information. Second, the Privacy Rule allows some information uses
and disclosures disallowed by state rules of professional conduct and
complained of by patients like the plaintiffs in Biddle.
B. HITECH’s Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care
Counsel Is Illogical and Unnecessary
As discussed in Part III, HITECH makes BAs adhere to the same
Privacy Rule use and disclosure requirements that apply to covered
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177

entities. The problem is that the Privacy Rule’s use and disclosure
requirements were designed for health industry participants and are
178
illogical when applied to attorneys. For example, the Privacy Rule
allows Covered Entities to freely use and disclose PHI for their own
179
treatment, payment, and related health care operations activities.
Health care providers use PHI to treat their patients, health plans use
PHI to determine whether and how much to pay for such treatments,
and both health care providers and health plans engage in dozens of
related health care operations activities, so this particular use and
disclosure allowance makes a great deal of sense in the health care
setting. Attorneys do not treat patients or request payment for treating
patients, (and to do so would constitute the unlicensed and criminal
180
practice of medicine as well as state and federal health care fraud
181
and abuse ) so the regulatory allowance for treatment and payment
activities usually does not make sense in the legal setting. In fact,
other than “legal services,” which is included in the fourth paragraph
182
of the six-paragraph definition of “health care operations,”
attorneys do not engage in, or perform on behalf of their covered
entity clients, most of the other activities that are regulated by the
standards, requirements, and implementation specifications set forth
in the Privacy Rule. These activities include, but are not limited to,
patient referrals, patient consultations, health care utilization review,
medical necessity reviews, risk adjustments based on a current or
prospective insured’s health status and demographic characteristics,
training of health care professionals, health care quality assessment
and improvement, development of clinical guidelines, health care
protocol development, case management and care coordination,
177 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The additional
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable with
respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”);
Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)) (stating
that a BA is not permitted to use or disclose PHI in a manner that would violate the
requirements of the Privacy Rule if done by a covered entity).
178 See infra text accompanying notes 179–89.
179 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1).
180 See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.001 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg.
Sess.) (prohibiting an individual from practicing medicine without a license to practice
medicine); id. § 165.151(a) (making the unlicensed practice of medicine a criminal offense
in the State of Texas).
181 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) (codifying the federal False Claims Act
prohibition of the submission of health care claims by individuals not licensed to provide
health care).
182 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
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health care professional peer review, medical training of health care
professionals, health insurance underwriting, health insurance
premium rating, public health activities, biomedical and behavioral
183
research.
In summary, other than generally prohibiting attorneys
from inappropriately using or disclosing PHI, which state rules of
184
the provisions in the Final
professional conduct already prohibit,
185
Modifications are nonsensical when applied to attorneys.
On the other hand, ABA Model Rule 1.6 (and analogous provisions
within state rules of professional conduct) was designed expressly for
attorneys. Each provision within a state rule of professional conduct
makes sense when applied to an attorney with respect to the
attorney’s use or disclosure of confidential client information.
Typically, the main confidentiality provision requires all licensed
attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client information
acquired during the course of, or by reason of representation of, a
client, applies regardless of whether the client is a covered entity or
186
not.
Typically, the main provision applies not only to matters
communicated to the attorney in confidence by the client but also to
all information relating to the representation, whatever its source, and
regardless of whether the information was obtained from a covered
187
entity or a non-covered entity. All medical records, billing records,
and other information and data obtained by an attorney while
representing a covered entity or non-covered entity thus constitutes
“confidential information” for purposes of rules of professional
188
responsibility.
In addition, the ABA Model Rules and most state
183 Id. §§ 164.501–164.514 (regulating a variety of health care related uses and
disclosures of PHI).
184 See supra Part IV (summarizing the confidentiality obligations of attorneys under
state rules of professional conduct).
185 See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695 (adding new 45 C.F.R. §
164.500(c), stating: “Where provided, the standards, requirements, and implementation
specifications adopted under this subpart apply to a business associate with respect to the
protected health information of a covered entity.”).
186 See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2012 amendments).
187 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 361
(Wis. 2001).
188 See, e.g., id. (discussing a disciplinary action taken by then-named Wisconsin Board
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) against a Wisconsin-licensed attorney for
his failure to maintain the confidentiality of his client’s medical records; the Board
suspended the attorney’s license to practice law for six months after finding, among other
things, that the client “did not authorize [the attorney] to release her medical records to
anyone. [The attorney’s] disclosure of information that he obtained while representing [the
client] violated client-lawyer confidentiality”; the Wisconsin Supreme Court further
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rules of professional conduct list situations in which an attorney may
189
Unlike the
disclose otherwise confidential client information.
Privacy Rule’s exceptions for uses and disclosures of PHI for
treatment, payment, health care operations, and public policy
activities which, for the most part, are illogical when applied to
attorneys, the permissions set forth in state rules of professional
conduct make sense when applied to attorneys.
The extension of the Privacy Rule directly to outside counsel is
illogical for other reasons. For example, it is not clear that HHS has
the knowledge, skill, expertise, or resources to regulate attorneys.
Through its ten health-related operating divisions, including the
Administration for Children and Families, the Administration for
Community Living, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, the Food and Drug Administration,
the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Indian Health
Service, the National Institutes of Health, and the Substance Abuse
190
and Mental Health Services Administration, HHS’s stated mission
is to protect the health of all Americans and to provide essential
human services, especially for those who are least able to help
191
themselves.
HHS’s expertise, by its own admission, is in the
explained that, “[T]he rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters
communicated in confidence by the client, ‘ . . . but also to all information relating to the
representation whatever its source.’”).
189 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2011) (“A lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; (3) to prevent,
mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; (4) to secure legal
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer’s representation of the client; (6) to comply with other law or a court order; or (7)
to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of employment
or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed
information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the
client.”).
190 HHS Leadership: Operating Divisions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/open/contacts/index.html#od (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
191 About HHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013).

TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE)

852

4/4/2013 8:39 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 813

provision of health and human services to individuals who need
192
health care and social services, not in the provision of legal advice
to clients with legal problems or in the regulation or discipline of
attorneys.
Unlike HHS, each state bar has special expertise in the practice of
law, the requirements for the professional and ethical practice of law,
193
and the regulation of attorneys in that state.
Indeed, one of the
stated missions of most state bars is to assure that the public is
protected and served by attorneys and other legal services providers
who meet the highest standards of competence and ethics, including
194
All state bars are
standards relating to client confidentiality.
governed by a board of directors, governors, or trustees, the majority
of the members of which usually are attorneys who are also licensed
to practice law in that state and thus are familiar with the ethical and
legal requirements to which attorneys must adhere, including
195
requirements relating to client confidentiality. All state bars have a
discipline system that is designed to protect the public, the courts, and
the profession from attorneys who violate ethical rules covering their
196
professional conduct.
Given the extremely small number of cases
in which state-licensed attorneys have been accused by their clients or
197
state bars of the inappropriate use and disclosure of PHI,
this
Article suggests that: (1) state bars are appropriately educating
attorneys regarding the importance of client confidentiality; (2) the
sanctions that state bars may impose on non-compliant attorneys,
192 Id. (“The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the United States
government’s principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing
essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves.”).
193 See, e.g., The State Bar of California Overview, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www
.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/StateBarOverview.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) [hereinafter
State Bar of California].
194 See, e.g., id. (describing the mission of the State Bar of California); Our Mission at
the State Bar of Texas, STATE BAR OF TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template
.cfm?Section=Our_Mission&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=19576 (last
visited Jan. 28, 2013) (outlining the mission of “foster[ing] high standards of ethical
conduct for lawyers, enabl[ing] its members to better serve their clients and the public”);
Our Mission, STATE BAR OF NEV., http://www.nvbar.org/content/our-mission (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013) (“Our Mission is to govern the legal profession, to serve our members, and
to protect the public interest. Our Goals are . . . to uphold and elevate the standard of
honor, integrity, and courtesy in the legal profession . . . .”).
195 See, e.g., State Bar of California, supra note 193 (describing governance in the state
bar in relevant section of page).
196 See, e.g., id. (describing the state’s attorney discipline system in relevant section of
page).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 140–57.
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including fines, license suspension, and license revocation, are
serving as appropriate deterrents against breaches of confidentiality
involving PHI; and/or (3) attorneys learned in law school, through
required coursework in Professional Responsibility classes, the
importance of client confidentiality and have applied that learning to
protect client records that include PHI.
In summary, HITECH’s extension of Privacy Rule principles to
outside health care counsel is somewhat illogical and unnecessary
given: (1) the lack of evidence that attorneys inappropriately use or
disclose their covered entities’ PHI; (2) the fact that most of the
Privacy Rule is illogical when applied to attorneys; (3) the fact that
the only Privacy Rule provisions that make sense when applied to
attorneys are the general provisions that prohibit BAs from using or
198
disclosing PHI for non-permitted purposes;
(4) the fact that state
rules of professional conduct already prohibit attorneys from using or
disclosing PHI for non-legal and other inappropriate or non-permitted
purposes; and (5) the fact that HHS has stated expertise in the
provision of health and human services, not in the practice of law, the
regulation of attorneys, or the discipline of attorneys.
C. HITECH’S Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care
Counsel Will Exacerbate Existing Conflicts of Interest
HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule to outside health care
counsel also will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest. As
background, an attorney generally is prohibited from representing a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of
199
interest.
Under the ABA’s Model Rules, a concurrent conflict of
interest exists when either: (1) the attorney’s representation of one
client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another client, a
former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest of the
200
lawyer.
198 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(i) (requiring BAAs to “[e]stablish the permitted and
required uses and disclosures of such information by the business associate” and
prohibiting the BAA from authorizing the BA to further use or disclose the PHI in a
manner that would violate the Privacy Rule if done by the covered entity); Final
Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (adding new 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a), stating: “A . . .
business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as
permitted or required by [the Privacy Rule or the Breach Notification Rule]”).
199 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2011).
200 Id.
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Although the Privacy Rule and HITECH do not pit one covered
entity against another in a way that would implicate the first
provision, there is a risk that an outside health care counsel’s
representation of a covered entity, when the outside counsel is
required to enter into a BAA with that same covered entity, would be
materially limited by the personal interests of the outside counsel.
That is, in drafting the BAA between the covered entity and itself, the
outside counsel would have an interest in minimizing its obligations
under the BAA whereas the covered entity would desire provisions,
such as indemnification provisions and limitation of liability
provisions, that would protect the covered entity in the case of the
outside counsel’s own breach of confidentiality involving the covered
201
entity’s PHI.
In addition, under the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule, the outside
counsel was required to agree through the BAA to report to the
covered entity any inappropriate uses or disclosures of the covered
entity’s PHI of which the BA became aware, including the outside
202
counsel’s own inappropriate uses and disclosures.
Because the
BAA was required to authorize the covered entity to terminate the
BAA (and therefore the underlying representation agreement) if the
covered entity determined that the BA violated a material term of the
203
agreement, and because the outside counsel’s reporting of its own
inappropriate uses and disclosures to the covered entity could result in
the covered entity’s termination of the BAA (and therefore the
underlying representation agreement), the outside counsel had a
personal interest in not reporting any confidentiality violations to the
covered entity.
HITECH exacerbates these conflicts of interest due to its creation
of four new breach notification requirements. First, HITECH requires
covered entities to notify each individual whose uPHI has been, or is
reasonably believed by the covered entity to have been, accessed,
204
acquired, or disclosed as a result of a breach.
Second, HITECH
requires covered entities to notify prominent media outlets serving a
201 See, e.g., Alan Stuart Goldberg, HIPAA, HITECH Act, Attorneys, and Business
Associates: Professional Conduct Contracting Requirements Are Expanding–Are You
Ready Now? VA. STATE BAR, 3, 5 (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections
/health/hipaahitech2010130929032010.pdf (discussing the potential conflicts of interest
that exist when an attorney represents a covered entity and enters into a BAA with that
covered entity, and the specific conflicts associated with indemnification provisions).
202 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(iii).
203 Id.
204 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115, 260 (2009).
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state or jurisdiction following the discovery of a breach of uPHI
205
involving more than 500 residents of such State or jurisdiction.
Third, HITECH requires covered entities to: (1) immediately notify
the Secretary of HHS following the discovery of a breach of uPHI
involving 500 or more individuals; and (2) create and maintain a log
of breaches involving less than 500 individuals and annually submit
206
such log to the Secretary.
Fourth, HITECH imposes additional
breach notification requirements directly on BAs. That is, HITECH
requires a BA who discovers a breach of uPHI to notify the covered
entity of the breach without unreasonable delay and in no case later
207
than sixty calendar days after the discovery of a breach.
If outside counsel (or one of counsel’s employees, agents, or
subcontractors) is the source of a confidentiality breach, counsel
would have an incentive not to notify its appropriate covered entity
client of such breach, in accordance with the fourth breach
notification requirements above, because counsel would risk: (1) the
covered entity’s termination of the BAA (and, thus, the underlying
208
representation agreement), which would result in a loss to counsel
of the covered entity’s legal business; (2) the covered entity’s
reporting of the breach to the individuals who are the subject of the
209
information,
which could lead to private lawsuits against counsel
210
based on the disclosure tort, as in the Biddle case; (3) the covered
211
entity’s reporting of the breach to prominent media outlets, which
could be damaging to counsel’s business and personal reputation; and
212
(4) the covered entity’s reporting of the breach to the Secretary,
which could trigger an audit and lead to the imposition of civil and
213
criminal penalties directly against counsel. In summary, HITECH’s
breach notification requirements create additional risks that counsel’s
representation of the covered entity would be limited by counsel’s
own interest in not reporting confidentiality breaches in order to avoid
the loss of legal business, future tort lawsuits, damage to counsel’s
205

Id. § 13402(e)(2).
Id. § 13402(e)(3).
207 Id. § 13402(b); Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695 (adopting 45 C.F.R. §
164.410(b)).
208 See supra text accompanying note 203.
209 See supra text accompanying note 204.
210 See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999); see also supra text
accompanying notes 170–75.
211 See supra text accompanying note 205.
212 See supra text accompanying note 206.
213 See supra Part III.C.
206

TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE)

856

4/4/2013 8:39 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91, 813

reputation, government audits, and government-imposed civil and
criminal penalties.
It is also possible that outside counsel will discover a Privacy Rule
violation by the covered entity. Although the breach notification rules
do not require BAs to report covered entity violations to the
individuals who are the subject of the information, the media, or HHS
(so conflicts are not created due to any such mandatory notification
obligations), outside counsel certainly would want to avoid
complicity with the violation, especially because violations can give
rise to civil and criminal penalties for both covered entities and BAs.
Counsel who know of a Privacy Rule violation by a client covered
entity will thus face several ethical and professional questions,
including whether to represent the covered entity in any civil or
criminal action by the federal government or whether to withdraw
from representation due to a conflict, such as outright complicity or a
more subtle desire to minimize evidence of counsel’s own
contributions to the Privacy Rule violation and to provide evidence to
the government suggesting that the covered entity had greater fault.
Finally, as discussed in Part III.C, HITECH section 13411 provides
that BAs shall be subject to periodic audits by the Secretary of HHS
as one way of ensuring that BAs are complying with their new, direct,
214
privacy-related requirements.
The new statutory allowance for
auditing of BAs may be problematic from the perspective of the
covered entity because there is some precedent stating that production
of law firm records in response to government audits may waive both
the attorney-client privilege as well as work-product doctrine
215
protection.
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest,
an attorney may start or may continue to represent a client under the
Model Rules, but only if four criteria are satisfied: First, the attorney
must reasonably believe that he or she will be able to provide
“competent and diligent representation” to the covered entity; second,
the representation must not be “prohibited by law”; third, the
representation must not involve the “assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation
or other proceeding before a tribunal”; finally, each affected client
216
must give “informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
214
215
216

HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13411, 123 Stat. 115, 276 (2009).
CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 20.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2011).
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Although the second and third criteria should be non-issues in this
context, the first and fourth criteria do require further consideration.
The outside counsel must reasonably believe that he or she will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation to the covered
entity and the covered entity must give written, informed consent to
the conflict of interest. That is, the outside counsel must recognize:
(1) the incentives he or she will have to not include language in the
BAA that is favorable to the covered entity (and unfavorable to the
BA), such as indemnification or limitation of liability provisions; (2)
that he or she will have an incentive not to report its own
confidentiality lapses and breaches to the covered entity; (3) that in an
investigation by HHS into a breach that possibly involved both the
covered entity and the outside counsel, that counsel would have an
incentive to minimize its own contributions and blame the violation
on the covered entity; and (4) that any audit of itself by HHS could
result in waiver of both the attorney-client privilege as well as workproduct doctrine production. Given these recognitions, counsel would
have to make a determination that he or she would still be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to the covered entity. In
addition, counsel would need to disclose all of these potential
conflicts to the covered entity in writing and obtain the covered
entity’s consent to such conflicts. In summary, HITECH exacerbates
existing conflicts of interest between outside health care counsel and
covered entities.
VI
A LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROPOSAL
In light of the argument that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy
Rule’s confidentiality requirements directly to outside health care
counsel who meet the definition of a BA is unjustified, illogical, and
unnecessary, and will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between
outside health care counsel and their clients, the final question is
whether HITECH’s imposition of direct confidentiality duties on BAs
should be challenged, retained, or disposed of. It is unlikely that a
challenge by an individual attorney, group of attorneys, or law-related
professional association, such as the ABA, with respect to HITECH’s
extension of the Privacy Rule to attorneys would be successful. In
American Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission, the ABA
and the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) challenged the
direct application of the confidentiality-related requirements within
the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) to attorneys, reasoning
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that the GLBA did not give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
217
As background,
jurisdiction to regulate state-licensed attorneys.
effective in 1999, the GLBA imposed comprehensive confidentiality
obligations on financial institutions with respect to their clients’
218
nonpublic personal information.
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed
with the ABA and NYSBA and held that state-licensed attorneys
engaged in the practice of law were not “financial institutions” within
the GLBA’s provisions that required protection of consumer financial
219
information. The court reasoned:
The states have regulated the practice of law throughout the history
of the country; the federal government has not. This is not to
conclude that the federal government could not do so. We simply
conclude that it is not reasonable for an agency [the FTC] to decide
that Congress has chosen such a course of action in [GLBA
statutory] language
that is, even charitably viewed, at most
220
ambiguous.

It is unlikely that a challenge similar to the challenge in American
Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission would be effective
with respect to HITECH. Unlike the statutory provisions within the
GLBA, which did not extend authority to the FTC to regulate
attorneys as financial institutions, the statutory provisions within
221
HITECH specifically require the direct regulation of BAs.
In a later lawsuit, the ABA challenged the FTC’s application of the
federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act to
222
attorneys. As background, the FACT Act amended the Fair Credit
Reporting Act to authorize the FTC to promulgate regulations
requiring financial institutions and creditors to establish internal
223
procedures to prevent identity theft.
In 2007, the FTC adopted
identity theft rules (Red Flags Rules) that required such “financial
institutions and creditors to implement and maintain programs to
224
protect consumers from identity theft.” Neither the FACT Act nor
217

See Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 430 F.3d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 459.
219 Id. at 470–71.
220 Id. at 472.
221 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The additional
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable with
respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”).
222 Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 636 F.3d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
223 Id.
224 Id.
218
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the Red Flag Rules specified whether the Red Flags Rules applied to
225
In 2009, in response to public confusion regarding the
attorneys.
application of the Red Flags Rules, “the FTC issued an Extended
Enforcement Policy, explaining that ‘professionals, such as lawyers or
health care providers, who bill their clients after services are
rendered,’ would be considered ‘creditors’ under the [FACT Act] and
226
therefore, subject to the [Red Flags] Rule’s requirements.” Shortly
thereafter, the ABA sued, challenging the FTC’s Extended
Enforcement Policy on the grounds that the FTC had intruded upon
227
the practice of law, an area of traditional state regulation.
Due to
the enactment of subsequent legislation addressing the precise issue
before the court in favor of the ABA, the court ultimately dismissed
228
the case as moot.
In summary, there is precedent for a legal challenge to the direct
regulation of state-licensed attorneys by federal agencies; however,
such legal challenges were supported by a lack of statutory authority
for the extension of federal requirements to attorneys. In the instant
case, HITECH specifically states Congress’ desire to directly regulate
229
BAs.
The next question is whether the confidentiality duties imposed by
HITECH on BAs who are attorneys should be retained together with
the confidentiality duties imposed on attorneys under State Rules of
Professional Conduct (with the Privacy Rule’s preemption provisions
governing differences between the two sets of authorities). HHS knew
when it drafted the Privacy Rule that other confidentiality schemes
existed under state law and that the Privacy Rule would need to be
reconciled with such other confidentiality schemes to the extent such
230
authorities conflicted.
To that end, HHS included within the
Privacy Rule a provision specifying that, in general, the Privacy Rule

225

Id.
Id.; see also FTC Extended Enforcement Policy: Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, 16
C.F.R. § 681.1, 1 n.2 (2008) (“For example, creditors under the ECOA [Equal Credit
Opportunity Act] include professionals, such as lawyers or health care providers, who bill
their clients after services are rendered.”).
227 Am. Bar Ass’n, 636 F.3d at 643.
228 Id. at 649.
229 See supra text accompanying note 221.
230 See How Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Reduce the Potential for Conflict with State
Laws?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq
/preemption_of_state_law/401.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
226
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231

preempts contrary state laws. A state law will survive preemption,
however, if the state law relates to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information and is more stringent than the relevant
232
Privacy Rule provision. Among other examples, a state law would
be more stringent than a Privacy Rule provision if: (1) with respect to
a use or disclosure, the state law prohibits or restricts a use or
disclosure in circumstances under which such use or disclosure
otherwise would be permitted under the Privacy Rule; or (2) the state
law provides greater privacy protection for the individual who is the
233
subject of the PHI.
One of the reasons for the Privacy Rule’s preemption provisions
was to establish a new federal “floor” for the confidentiality of health
234
information.
Prior to the Privacy Rule, Congress and HHS found
that a patchwork of state law existed; that is, some states had no or
very few health information confidentiality protections while other
235
states had robust health information confidentiality protections.
Because the patchwork of state health information confidentiality
laws failed to provide a consistent and comprehensive legal
foundation relating to health information confidentiality, Congress
and HHS desired a national health information confidentiality policy
236
with consistent rules.

231 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2011) (“A standard, requirement, or implementation
specification adopted under this subchapter that is contrary to a provision of State law
preempts the provision of State law.”).
232 Id. § 160.203(b).
233 Id. § 160.202 (defining “more stringent”).
234 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,464 (“The rule sets a floor of
ground rules for health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses to
follow, in order to protect patients and encourage them to seek needed care. The rule seeks
to balance the needs of the individual with the needs of the society. It creates a framework
of protection that can be strengthened by both the federal government and by states as
health information systems continue to evolve.”).
235 Id. at 82,466 (“States have, to varying degrees, attempted to enhance confidentiality
by establishing laws governing at least some aspects of medical record privacy. This
approach, though a step in the right direction, is inadequate. These laws fail to provide a
consistent or comprehensive legal foundation of health information privacy. For example,
there is considerable variation among the states in the type of information protected and
the scope of the protections provided.”).
236 Id. at 82,466 (“Neither private action nor state laws provide a sufficiently
comprehensive and rigorous legal structure to allay public concerns, protect the right to
privacy, and correct the market failures caused by the absence of privacy protections . . .
Hence, a national policy with consistent rules is necessary to encourage the increased and
proper use of electronic information while also protecting the very real needs of patients to
safeguard their privacy.”).
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Unlike the topic of health information confidentiality, which prior
to the 2003 compliance date for the Privacy Rule did not have a
consistent or comprehensive national legal foundation, the topic of
attorney-client confidentiality had its start over a century ago. In
1908, the ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics, including a canon relating to client
237
confidentiality.
In 1969 and 1983, the ABA House of Delegates
adopted its first Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
238
Both the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, respectively.
Model Code and the Model Rules contained rules relating to client
239
confidentiality.
Michigan adopted the Model Rules in 1988, and
West Virginia, California, and Hawaii followed suit in 1989, 1992,
240
and 1994, respectively.
As of today, fifty jurisdictions, including
241
the District of Columbia, have adopted the Model Rules. California
is the only state that does not have professional conduct rules that
242
follow the format of the ABA Model Rules.
In summary, one of the reasons for the Privacy Rule’s preemption
provisions was to establish a new federal “floor” for the
confidentiality of health information due to the nonexistence,
insufficiency, and/or inconsistency of state law on the topic. In
contrast, the ABA through its Model Rules in 1983 (and earlier
through its Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908 and its Model Code
of Professional Responsibility in 1969) had already established a
national, consistent set of rules relating to attorney ethics, including
client confidentiality, that nearly every jurisdiction has adopted.
Below, this Article proposes that Congress amend HITECH to give
HHS the authority to except certain classes of BAs, including outside
counsel, from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. This proposal has
237 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
238 Id.
239 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (as amended 1983).
240 See Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/chrono_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
241 See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
242 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
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its foundation in HHS’s decision to except other classes of
individuals, institutions, and information from regulation by the
Privacy Rule when there exists a national, sufficient, and consistent
set of relevant rules. In 2002, for example, HHS exempted from
regulation under the Privacy Rule academic institutions that
maintained education records that also contain PHI due to the
national, sufficient, and consistent confidentiality protections already
in place under the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
243
of 1974 (FERPA).
HHS reasoned that Congress specifically
addressed how academic institutions should protect the confidentiality
of education records, including education records that contain PHI,
under FERPA and that Congress probably did not intend to amend or
244
preempt FERPA when it enacted HIPAA.
HHS further reasoned
that it would be unduly burdensome for health care providers
employed by academic institutions to have to comply with two
different, yet similar, sets of regulations under FERPA and
245
HIPAA.
Similarly, the ABA already specifically addressed how attorneys
should maintain the confidentiality of all information relating to a
client’s representation and that states have responded by enacting
their own state rules of professional conduct, almost all of which
follow the same format as the ABA’s Model Rules. Further, it would
be unduly burdensome for attorneys who represent covered entities to
have to comply with two different sets of rules; that is, their own state
rules of professional conduct and the Privacy Rule, especially when
the Privacy Rule is illogical when applied to attorneys.
Instead of challenging or retaining HHS’s ability to regulate BAs,
Congress should amend HITECH to give HHS the authority to except
certain classes of BAs, including outside health care counsel, from
direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. There is precedent in other
federal health laws for such an exception. When initially enacted in
246
1989, for example, the federal Stark Law
directly regulated
physicians who referred Medicare and Medicaid patients to clinical

243 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,483 (“We have excluded education
records covered by FERPA . . . from the definition of protected health information. . . . We
followed this course because Congress specifically addressed how information in
education records should be protected in FERPA. . . . We do not believe Congress
intended to amend or preempt FERPA when it enacted HIPAA.”).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
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laboratories with which the physicians had a financial relationship.
Effective in 1995, amendments to the Stark Law expanded the law’s
application to physicians who referred Medicare and Medicaid
patients to entities with which they had a financial relationship for a
number of additional designated health services (DHS). In addition to
clinical laboratory services, DHS now includes physical therapy,
occupational therapy, and outpatient speech-language pathology
services; radiology and certain other imaging services; radiation
therapy services and supplies; durable medical equipment and
supplies; parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies;
prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies; home
health services; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and
248
outpatient hospital services.
Given the extremely broad statutory
list of DHS for which physicians are prohibited from referring
Medicare and Medicaid patients if a financial relationship exists,
Congress in the Stark Law gave HHS the authority to except certain
249
relationships from the general referral prohibition. HHS responded
by establishing through regulations certain exceptions so that the
referral prohibition set forth in the Stark Law was not overly broad
and did not prohibit relationships that would not give rise to health
250
care fraud and abuse.
Similarly, Congress should amend HITECH section 13404,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17934, by adding certain language at the end
of subsections (a) and (c). The proposed language would recognize
that some classes of BAs: (1) do not have a history, or pattern or
practice, of inappropriately using or disclosing their covered entity
clients’ PHI; (2) are already regulated under other law, such as state
law, with respect to their uses and disclosures of their covered entity
clients’ PHI; and (3) already risk civil, criminal, and/or administrative
penalties by agencies with more experience and expertise than HHS
in regulating such BAs. The proposed additions to subsection (a)
would give HHS the authority to except qualifying classes of BAs
from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule and the proposed additions
to subsection (c) would except the same qualifying classes of BAs
from the additional imposition of civil and criminal penalties by the
247

AM. MED. ASS’N, THE STARK LAW RULES OF THE ROAD 2.1 (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6).
249 See id. § 1395nn(b)(4) (giving HHS the authority to adopt “other permissible
exceptions” if the Secretary determines that the excepted relationships do not pose a risk
of Medicare or Medicaid Program or patient abuse).
250 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350–411.389 (2011).
248
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federal government under the HIPAA statute. The proposed language
is italicized and placed at the end of each subsection within 42 U.S.C.
§ 17934, as follows:
(a) Application of contract requirements. In the case of a business
associate of a covered entity that obtains or creates protected health
information pursuant to a written contract (or other written
arrangement) described in section 164.502(e)(2) of title 45, Code of
Federal Regulations, with such covered entity, the business
associate may use and disclose such protected health information
only if such use or disclosure, respectively, is in compliance with
each applicable requirement of section 164.504(e) of such title. The
additional requirements of this subchapter that relate to privacy and
that are made applicable with respect to covered entities shall also
be applicable to such a business associate and shall be incorporated
into the business associate agreement between the business
associate and the covered entity. The Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services shall have the authority to except
certain classes of business associates from the direct application of
this subchapter. The Secretary’s authority to grant such exceptions
shall be based on evidence showing that the excepted classes: (i) do
not have a historical pattern or practice of inappropriately using or
disclosing protected health information; (ii) are restricted in using
and disclosing protected health information by state or other
applicable law; and (iii) are already subject to civil, criminal,
and/or administrative penalties for the inappropriate use or
disclosure of confidential information by a state or other
administrative agency with experience and expertise in regulating
the excepted class.
(c) Application of civil and criminal penalties. In the case of a
business associate that violates any provision of subsection (a) or
(b), the provisions of sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d–5, 1320d–6) shall apply to the business
associate with respect to such violation in the same manner as such
provisions apply to a person who violates a provision of part C of
title XI of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq.]. If the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human services excepts a class of
business associates from the direct application of this subchapter
under subsection (a) of this section, that class of business associates
shall also be excepted from the
imposition of civil and criminal
251
penalties under this subsection.

HHS should further amend the Privacy Rule to establish a process
through which HHS can implement such exceptions and identify
excepted classes of BAs. Specifically, HHS should add the following
italicized language to the Privacy Rule at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(d)
establishing the criteria to be used in making exception decisions, as
251

42 U.S.C. §§ 17934(a), (c) (2011).
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well as at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e) in order to clarify that state-licensed
attorneys have been granted an exception:
(d) Where provided, and unless the class to which the business
associate belongs has been excepted by the Secretary from direct
regulation by this subchapter under subsection (d) of this section,
the standards, requirements, and implementation specifications
adopted under this subpart apply to a business associate with respect
to the protected health information of a covered entity.
(e) The following classes of business associates shall be excepted
from direct regulation by this subchapter based on evidence
showing that the excepted classes do not have a historical pattern
or practice of inappropriately using or disclosing protected health
information, are already restricted in using and disclosing
protected health information by state or other applicable law, and
are already subject to civil, criminal, and/or administrative
penalties for the inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI by a state
or other administrative agency with experience and expertise in
regulating the excepted class: (1) state-licensed attorneys who are
required to maintain the confidentiality of client communications
and records under state rules of professional conduct and who are
subject to disciplinary action by their State Bars for their failure to
maintain the confidentiality of client communications; (2) False

Note that the Secretary may build on the proposed language set forth
in 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e) over time, by adding additional subsections at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e)(2), (3), (4), etc., to identify
additional excepted classes of BAs.
Finally, state bars should consider strengthening the sanctions that
may be imposed on licensed attorneys who fail to maintain the
confidentiality of client communications and records that contain
PHI. In In re Harman, remember, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility’s (Board’s) decision to impose a six-month suspension
of Wisconsin-licensed attorney Harman’s license to practice law
based on a number of professional failures, including Harman’s
mishandling of client funds, his representation of a client in the
presence of a conflict of interest without obtaining a written consent
of the conflict, his knowing disobeyance of an obligation of tribunal
rules, his use of information obtained during the representation of a
former client to that former client’s disadvantage, and his revelation
of information relating to the representation of the client without the
252
client’s consent.
With respect to the last allegation, the Supreme
252 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Wis.
2001).
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Court of Wisconsin held that Harman violated Rule 1.6(a) of the
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys when he
disclosed the client’s PHI, including information stating that the client
had a history of drug and alcohol dependence and a history of selfabusive behavior. State agencies such as the Board should be
authorized to impose more stringent sanctions when the client
communications or records that were inappropriately used or
disclosed by the attorney contain PHI. Specifically, the ABA should
consider adding a new comment (following the existing nineteen
253
comments that interpret) Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules, as follows:
Protected Health Information
[20] When using or disclosing client information that contains
protected health information, as defined by federal regulation at 45
C.F.R. § 160.103, the lawyer shall recognize the sensitivity of such
information. The inappropriate use or disclosure of client
information containing protected health information may be
considered as an aggravating factor in imposing disciplinary action
upon the lawyer.

CONCLUSION
Outside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records,
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other records
containing individually identifiable health information in the course
of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice,
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review,
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters. This
Article is the first to argue that state rules of professional conduct, not
federal health information confidentiality regulations, should govern
outside health care counsel’s use and disclosure of confidential client
information.
This Article’s proposal—that Congress give HHS the authority to
except certain classes of BAs, including outside health care counsel,
from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule—is based on several
research findings, including the lack of a historical pattern or practice
on the part of attorneys in inappropriately using or disclosing PHI, the
lack of fit between the health care-related requirements of the Privacy
Rule and the legal reasons for which attorneys use and disclose PHI,
the presence and effectiveness of state rules of professional conduct
that already require attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client

253

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. (2011).
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information, the availability of disciplinary action for attorneys who
fail to maintain confidentiality, and the experience and expertise of
State Bars (and the lack of experience and expertise on HHS’s part) in
regulating and disciplining attorneys.
Going forward, Congress and HHS should more carefully consider
the broad application of health care-related regulations to non-health
industry participants. Congress and HHS’s desire to protect the
confidentiality of PHI from inappropriate uses and disclosures by
BAs is laudable. However, the direct regulation of outside health care
counsel by the Privacy Rule causes duplication of regulation and
disciplinary authority and exacerbates existing conflicts of interest
between counsel and their covered entity clients.
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